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In contemporary human brain mapping, it is commonly assumed that the “mind
is what the brain does”. Based on that assumption, task-based imaging studies of
the last three decades measured differences in brain activity that are thought to
reflect the exercise of human mental capacities (e.g., perception, attention, memory).
With the advancement of resting state studies, tractography and graph theory in the
last decade, however, it became possible to study human brain connectivity without
relying on cognitive tasks or constructs. It therefore is currently an open question
whether the assumption that “the mind is what the brain does” is an indispensable
working hypothesis in human brain mapping. This paper argues that the hypothesis
is, in fact, dispensable. If it is dropped, researchers can “meet the brain on its
own terms” by searching for new, more adequate concepts to describe human brain
organization. Neuroscientists can establish such concepts by conducting exploratory
experiments that do not test particular cognitive hypotheses. The paper provides a
systematic account of exploratory neuroscientific research that would allow researchers
to form new concepts and formulate general principles of brain connectivity, and to
combine connectivity studies with manipulation methods to identify neural entities
in the brain. These research strategies would be most fruitful if applied to the
mesoscopic scale of neuronal assemblies, since the organizational principles at this
scale are currently largely unknown. This could help researchers to link microscopic and
macroscopic evidence to provide a more comprehensive understanding of the human
brain. The paper concludes by comparing this account of exploratory neuroscientific
experiments to recent proposals for large-scale, discovery-based studies of human brain
connectivity.
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INTRODUCTION
Since the wedding of cognitive psychology with positron emission
tomography (PET) in the 1980’s and functional magnetic reso-
nance imaging (fMRI) in the 1990’s, neuroscientists commonly
assume that “the mind is what the brain does”. In the broad
generality of a neuroscientific textbook opening, the assumption
entails that “all of behavior and all of mental life have their origin
in the structure and function of the nervous system” (Squire et al.,
2012, p. xix). In functional neuroimaging—which will be the
focus of this review—researchers therefore often ask participants
to execute a task (e.g., finger-tapping, counting, memorizing
numbers) while non-invasively measuring brain activity. Since
the measured differences in activity are thought to reflect the
exercise of human mental capacities, human brain function is
primarily understood psychologically (Kosslyn, 1999). In the last
decade, however, several methodological (resting state fMRI),
technological (diffusion weighted imaging, i.e., DWI) and the-
oretical (graph network analysis) advances made it possible to
study human brain connectivity without using cognitive tasks
or constructs in the experimental design (Tournier et al., 2004;
Shehzad et al., 2009; Sporns, 2011, 2014). The emerging field
of connectomics combines such advances with classic methods
(e.g., micro-anatomy and electrophysiology) to uncover organi-
zational principles of the human brain. In contrast to hypothesis-
driven, task-based research, the discovery science of connectomics
often uses data-driven methods and large sample sizes (Sporns
et al., 2005; Biswal et al., 2010). The term “connectome” fur-
thermore puts the significance of connectivity approaches next
to Big Science such as the Human Genome Project (for a
review, see Lichtman and Sanes, 2008). But scientific criticism
of their “uncognitive” nature often leads researchers to frame
connectivity studies in psychological terms (e.g., “default mode
network”), or to promise that their results will be relevant for
the treatment of behavioral and psychiatric disorders (such as
ADHD or Alzheimer). Given the current co-existence of both
approaches, it seems an open question whether the working
hypothesis “the mind is what the brain does” is indispensable
in human brain mapping and its link to other methods such as
electrophysiology.
My contention in this paper is to show that the hypothe-
sis is, in fact, dispensable. Its maintenance prevents researchers
from scrutinizing which concepts are adequate to describe the
human brain. If the general hypothesis is dropped, researchers
can “meet the brain on its own terms” by conducting exploratory
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experiments that do not require the testing of particular cognitive
hypotheses. Such experiments would allow neuroscientists to
search for new, non-cognitive concepts to describe the human
brain. The first part of the paper introduces a theoretical frame-
work that justifies the use of exploratory experiments by showing
how neuroscience is methodologically autonomous from cog-
nitive psychology. Such a framework is needed since common
philosophical conceptions of neuroscience view the assumption
that “the mind is what the brain does” as indispensable for
investigating human brain function. The second and main part
of the paper then puts this framework into practice by intro-
ducing three research strategies that do not require the use of
cognitive concepts. By using historical examples of exploratory
experiments in physics and molecular biology I show how such
experiments may allow brain researchers: (i) to form new con-
cepts and formulate general principles of brain connectivity; and
(ii) to combine connectivity studies with manipulation methods
to identify neuronal entities in the brain. I argue furthermore;
that (iii) both these research strategies may be most fruitful if
applied to the mesoscopic scale of neuronal assemblies, since
the organizational principles at this scale are currently largely
unknown. Based on this account of exploratory experimen-
tation in neuroscience, the last part of the paper discusses
to what extent large-scale proposals of discovery-based con-
nectivity mappings could meet the human brain “on its own
terms”.1
THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS: TOWARDS A NEW
PERSPECTIVE ON HUMAN BRAIN ORGANIZATION
This paper starts from the assumption that the principles gov-
erning the structure and function of the brain can be asserted
independently from the principles that make the capacity for
human mentation intelligible. The reason for this independence
is that many scientific practices disclose entities—such as genes,
tectonic plates or spiral galaxies—for which there are little or
no conceptual resources for describing them in non-scientific
language (Rouse, 2011). Similarly, neuroscientific practice spec-
ifies the criteria for entities such as neurons, cortical areas and
networks, for which there are little or no descriptive resources in
our ordinary discourse about human mental capacities. Because
brain researchers and philosophers of neuroscience commonly
assume that “the mind is what the brain does”, it is often
overlooked that the criteria for being a mind or a brain are
developed and maintained in distinct practices.2 Emphasizing
the difference between both practices resembles the argument
1The perspective of this paper is to develop an alternative philosophical under-
standing of human brain mapping. The discussion of particular studies is
therefore not meant to question their empirical validity, but to constructively
point out the potential and issues of cognitive approaches that are hypothesis-
driven, and discovery-based connectomics studies. By cognitive approaches,
I would also broadly include studies of social and affective neuroscience, as
long as they are attempting to functionally localize capacities like empathy,
romantic love or various emotions in the human brain.
2Various philosophers of neuroscience have interpreted the supposed identity
between mental capacities and brain activity in the above statement differently,
as implying a reduction of cognitive processes to neural events (Bickle, 2003),
as a heuristic theory of identity between cognitive operations and neural
mechanisms (Bechtel, 2008), or as expressing that the correct theory of the
that neuroscientists misuse psychological concepts, whose proper
logical subject is the whole human being, by applying them to a
part of such beings, i.e., the brain (Bennett and Hacker, 2003).
Since proficient speakers of ordinary language do not have any
conception of what it would be for a brain to think, decide or
feel something, the attribution of such concepts to the brain
makes no sense. Equivalently it does not make sense to apply
the opposites of these concepts to the brain: “The brain neither
sees, nor is it blind—just as sticks and stones are not awake, but
they are not asleep either” (Bennett and Hacker, 2003, p. 72). The
fallacy, in other words, consists in conflating two different sets of
criteria in one statement, by describing what activity patterns are
possible for neurons, synapses, areas or networks in terms of what
behavior is possible for the whole human organism.
Although my practice-based view of neuroscience resembles
Bennett and Hacker’s general critique that brain scientists often
do not use psychological concepts properly, their argument is
both too strong and too weak for the position advocated here.
It is too strong if the logic of applying psychological concepts
in everyday speech is taken as evidence for the claim that the
“mind is not what the brain does”. In order to establish new
concepts to describe the brain more adequately, researchers would
neither have to affirm or deny any such claim. They would instead
need a new perspective that would allow them to investigate
the human brain without having to use cognitive vocabulary to
describe its function. Bennett and Hacker’s position is too weak
to explicate what kinds of research strategies would contribute
to the establishment of such a perspective. Even if the activity
of brain areas is not equated with mental capacities, they con-
clude that researchers should still “correlate neural events and
processes” to psychological concepts, or identify the “causally
necessary conditions for the human being to think or perceive,
imagine and intend” (Bennett and Hacker, 2003, p. 117). On the
basis of task-based fMRI studies, however, it is difficult to assess
whether correlating psychological concepts to changes in neural
activity adequately captures human brain organization. Part of
the difficulty is that isolating cognitive components by subtracting
a control condition from changes in neural activity while the
subject executes a task is circular (Van Orden and Paap, 1997).
It assumes not only that the actual cognitive components are
known—and are accurately captured by concepts like “working
memory”—but also that the components correspond one-to-one
to the activated brain areas (modularity), which themselves are
connected in a strictly feedforward fashion. Only then can it
be ruled out that other activity changes do not influence the
cognitive component that was localized in a particular brain
region by means of subtraction. Given our current physiological
knowledge of the fMRI signal, this feedforward view of brain
organization is most likely to be false (see the section below on
neural entities for further discussion). What is important for
now is that the methods of task-based fMRI studies lead to the
mind will also be the correct theory of the brain (Roskies, 2010). Craver
(2007) argues that psychological phenomena are constituted by the neural
mechanisms that explain them, but holds open the possibility that the current
cognitive conceptual framework “could be ill-matched to the mechanistic
structures of the brain” (ibid., p. 124).
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functional localization of alleged cognitive components regardless
of whether the modularity and feedforward assumptions are
true. Consider for instance, how statistical significance tests are
used to determine which voxels contain neurons that were active
during the subject’s execution of a task. Applying a conventionally
statistical threshold (most commonly α = 0.05) to the recorded
data will result in isolated activation patterns, even though the
null hypothesis (i.e., that the experimental task had no effect on
the data) is strictly speaking false for causally dense systems such
as the brain, in which every neuron is at least weakly connected to
every other neuron (cf. Savoy, 2001). Since the method of statis-
tical thresholding arbitrarily excludes small, but potentially task-
related changes in neuronal activity from activation maps, these
maps do not provide proper evidence for localization hypotheses
that predict “that a given brain region plays a particular causal
role during the performance of a cognitive task” (Klein, 2010,
p. 265).
This short review of the issues of subtraction and statistical
testing does not imply that the use of cognitive tasks and con-
structs in fMRI studies is altogether unjustified, especially since
more sophisticated experimental designs and statistical analyses
exist (Klein, 2010; Poldrack, 2010). Nor does it suggest that
other approaches such as anatomical or functional connectivity
studies are exempt from issues such as arbitrary thresholds, for
instance when cortical areas are defined by a family of clus-
ters with similar connectional fingerprints (Passingham et al.,
2002). It rather points out that in order to eventually use cog-
nitive concepts in a noncircular way, neuroscientists would first
need an independent check on whether the activation patterns
found through task-based studies adequately reflect an aspect
of human brain organization.3 Such a check could be made
possible through a perspective on human brain function and
organization that does not proceed by a hypothesis-driven search
for the causally necessary conditions of mental capacities such as
“memory”, “attention” or “perception”. The data-driven methods
of connectomics—so I shall argue—might provide or contribute
to such a perspective, and therefore seem to be the most promising
candidate to meet the brain “on its own terms” to date. Neuro-
scientists have investigated the anatomical or chemical structures
of the human brain, as well as its metabolic or homeostatic
functions without using cognitive concepts, long before connec-
tomics emerged as a separate subdiscipline. But what seems to
be distinctive about the perspective of connectomics is that it
provides general principles (such as network motifs that specify
recurrent “building blocks” within complex connectivity patterns
cf. Sporns and Kötter, 2004; see also Song et al., 2005) that reliably
track known functional and structural features of human brain
organization (cf. Shehzad et al., 2009; Tymofiyeva et al., 2014).
Given this convergence with former anatomical and physiological
3Independence is therefore a related but stronger demand than “functional
triangulation”, by which circularity is supposed to be overcome on the basis
of between-study comparisons of tasks, designs and techniques within the
cognitive neuroimaging approach (Roskies, 2010). Such checks are important
to ensure the quality, but are insufficient to assess the adequacy of functional
localization studies for investigating human brain organization (see the dis-
cussion of scale and inhibitory-excitatory microcircuits below, which Roskies
mentions as well).
evidence (but also evidence from task-based studies, cf. Nelson
et al., 2010), connectomics researchers are now in a position
to develop new research strategies which do not presuppose a
psychological theory or cognitive hypotheses that decompose
human brain functions into cognitive components. The target
of such research strategies would be the extension of connec-
tomics studies to the level of “working principles”. Such principles
specify how brain parts defined by their connectivity interact
with one another, given what is known about the anatomical,
chemical and metabolic constraints on human brain function.
Ideally, understanding the brain in terms of connectivity would
also elucidate how brain networks interact with the rest of the
body so that whole human organisms exhibit intelligent behav-
ior (Sporns, 2011). Notice that as a result of the independence
from cognitive, hypothesis-driven approaches, it could even be
possible that these new connectomics research strategies lead to
results that are incompatible with our previous understanding of
certain interactions of neurons, areas and networks as “causally
necessary conditions” for mental capacities.4 Whether they are
incompatible will depend on the results established through
the types of exploratory research strategies that are discussed
below.
Even if connectomics represents a new perspective on human
brain organization, it still needs to be shown why the corre-
sponding research strategies would not employ cognitive concepts
in neuroscientific practice. Consider therefore how a general
psychological statement about human brain function would be
confirmed by an experimental neuroscientific result. Visual per-
ception experiments, for instance, indicate that action potentials
directly invoked through eye stimulation are accompanied by
many signals from areas whose function is to detect more spe-
cialized features. The ratio between signals from the eye and from
upstream areas suggests that perception involves comparative
processes between present and past stimuli. But the forms of
neuronal adaptive activity that make such comparisons possible
are the same as for other phenomena such as learning or memory
(Wolpert, 2007). By reference to the same neuronal adaptive
activity these cognitive phenomena become empirically indistin-
guishable from one another. The flipside of the same problem is
that a diverse group of neuronal processes can account for the
same psychological construct, depending how it is functionally
decomposed (see the example of “intention” in Turner, 2012). In
order to distinguish—or in the intention case, unify—cognitive
behavior on the basis of neuroscientific evidence, researchers
additionally need to consider what patterns in the data are made
4Stressing the potential incompatibility of connectomic and cognitive neuro-
scientific results adds another dynamic component to Wimsatt’s account of
detecting the properties of a system by various means of access (cf. Wimsatt,
1994). Wimsatt takes the initial convergence (in this case: the convergence of
connectomics results with results from other histological or imaging methods)
to establish both how robust a property and how reliable the technique
detecting it is. Once robustness and reliability are established, divergent results
of different methods can indicate aspects of the system unknown so far. I
would add that discovering such new aspects can also retroactively change the
relations among previous evidence in a way that former assumptions about
the system need to be given up (for a case study of this temporal process in
molecular biology, see Rheinberger, 1997).
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salient from a certain conceptual outlook (Lange, 2000b). Compare
how in chemistry, the Van der Waals gas law makes a shift
from an increase to a decrease of the product of pressure and
volume salient, when researchers add the “working assumption
that all gases are composed of small ceaselessly moving particles
attracting each other by short range forces” to the mathematical
equation (cf. ibid., 219). From this “molecular gas” outlook,
gas particles will be so close together at high pressures that the
volume will decrease slower than the pressure will rise. In a
similar fashion, a psychological conceptual outlook on human
brain function allows researchers to identify a salient pattern
among the diverse neuronal processes that instantiate a construct
like “intention”, or gives them additional cognitive behavioral
evidence that distinguishes the outcome of neuronal adaptive
activity into instances of “perception”, “memory”, or “learning”.
The relevant parallel between the general statements of chemistry
and psychology is that their empirical counterparts do only count
as counterparts if the varying instances are subsume under the
chemical or psychological concepts.5 Therefore, a perspective
such as connectomics can only be new and independent from
a psychological outlook if researchers do not evaluate divergent
findings against the same salient patterns. Equivalently, the alter-
native research strategies within that perspective would only be
new and independent if they employ alternative concepts, which
allow neuroscientists to make salient generalizations about the
activity patterns of neural entities that could be unintelligible
from a psychological outlook.
The argument for an alternative, noncognitive conceptual
outlook adds to common philosophical conceptions (e.g., Fodor,
1974) that neuroscience is autonomous from psychology. While
the generalizations of both disciplines (i.e., their laws) often
converge on what is actually happening, they can diverge in spec-
ifying what neural activity or psychological behavior is possible.
Neuroscientific laws that specify possible patterns of brain activity
could therefore hold even if psychological laws are violated (cf.
Lange, 2000a,b). Consider Hebb’s law that relates the efficiency
of signal transmission and temporally co-occuring pre- and post-
synaptic activity. Casually stated as “neurons that fire together,
wire together”, it would hold even if a change in natural and
cultural evolution had resulted in humans with very different
cognitive abilities. While generalizations like psychophysical laws
about our perceptual capacities would be violated in this sce-
nario, Hebb’s law remains stable—even if those brains are wired
differently—because it only specifies when the strengthening of
neuronal connections is possible or impossible, not what specific
connections will form in the brain. In fact, Hebb’s law could even
hold if these brains are wired similarly to ours, while their bearers
possess different cognitive functions. The reason is that the role
of a specific (neural) mechanism depends on its integration into
the functional economy of the whole organism (i.e., how an
5Such a parallel does not imply that generalizations in neuroscience need to
possess the same invariance as physical or chemical laws. General statements
about brain organization have to accommodate for different constraints
(evolutionary and individual variability, stochastic occurrence of neuronal
events) and serve different purposes (such as integration of molecular, cellular
and brainwide aspects of neural mechanisms) than physical or chemical laws,
(see also Lange, 2000a).
organism responds to and interacts with environmental pressures
or cues within its environmental niche). In genetics, the Pax6 gene
is highly conserved across species (humans, mice, Drosophila)
in the mechanism of eye development, but the resulting light-
sensing organs differ widely as their role differs across species-
specific navigational patterns, food-searching behavior or visual
discrimination of environmental cues (Carroll et al., 2005). With
respect to the evolutionary distinct version of homo sapiens, it is
similarly possible that they share with us the connectivity patterns
formed by Hebbian synaptic strengthening. The functional role
of these patterns, however, would differ with respect to which
evolutionary pressures these organisms had to adapt to.
To summarize, in this section I introduced a theoretical frame-
work to argue for a new perspective on human brain organization
from which researchers can specify the criteria for neural enti-
ties, without having to assume which causal role these entities
play in cognitive processes observed at the behavioral level of
human subjects. Specifying these criteria requires an alterna-
tive, non-cognitive conceptual outlook that allows an intelligible
grouping of experimental results under general principles. The
methodological advances of connectomics could provide such an
outlook, and will be therefore discussed in more detail below.
The example of Hebb’s law showed that such alternative gener-
alizations could even violate psychological generalizations, and
thus be unintelligible from our current cognitive outlook on
human brain function. Note that similar conflicts could also occur
in apparently non-cognitive aspects of neuroscientific practice
such as anatomical classification. Color-opponent neurons, for
instance, are functionally defined with regard to their opposite
responses to colors that cannot be perceived in combination (such
as green and red, cf. Zeki, 1993). With organizational principles
such as connectivity rules, researchers could group these cells
together with other anatomical elements, although they would
not have anything in common according to the psychological
theory of color-opponency. In order to search for non-cognitive
concepts that enable such new inductive strategies, researchers
would have to temporarily suspend, but not to eliminate psy-
chological concepts (pace Churchland, 1989 and Bickle, 2003).
But in the absence of a psychological outlook, such strategies
would also not be “conceptually parasitic on higher-level theory”
(pace Gold and Stoljar, 1999, p. 823). The psychological outlook
may therefore be re-evaluated in the light of new results that
were established through non-cognitive research strategies. The
theoretical framework outlined above provides a third alternative
to reductionist and non-reductionist positions in philosophy of
neuroscience, because it views both neuroscience and cognitive
psychology as methodologically autonomous from one another.
The main part of this paper now attempts to show how this
theoretical view makes a difference to neuroscientific practice,
because it results in alternative strategies to investigate the human
brain.
EXPLORATORY EXPERIMENTS IN NEUROSCIENCE
When scientists conduct exploratory experiments, their research
is not driven by specific hypotheses or general theories, but
rather by the attempt to systematically map out different aspects
of the phenomenon under investigation (Hacking, 1983). Such
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experiments could meet the brain “on its own terms” because
they would not require neuroscientists to test specific cogni-
tive hypotheses about human brain function. Resulting from
a one-sided focus on theory and hypothesis testing, philoso-
phers of science and scientific methodologists have repeatedly
criticized exploratory research as “blind data gathering” (in the
case of neuroscience, see Churchland, 1989; Kosslyn, 1999).
Such a criticism overlooks that the systematic character of
exploratory experiments contributes to the formation of new
scientific concepts. Without the most basic empirical concepts in a
domain of inquiry—e.g., “chemical reaction”, “mechanical force”
or “species”—descriptive or explanatory efforts of a scientific
practice are not even conceivable. Because the disclosing function
of scientific concepts is more fundamental than the theories that
can be formulated with them, changing a conceptual framework
can structure a whole field of later inquiry (Steinle, 1997). This
section therefore uses historical examples of exploratory research
to show how neuroscientists could develop new research strategies
to investigate the human brain without cognitive concepts or
hypotheses.
NEW CONCEPTS TO EXPLORE THE BRAIN? LESSONS FROM
ELECTROMAGNETISM
Early electromagnetic research provides an exceptionally clear his-
torical case of how physicists developed new concepts by conduct-
ing exploratory experiments. In 1820, Christian Oersted made the
surprising discovery that the connecting wire of a voltaic battery
has an effect on a magnetic needle close by. From the conceptual
outlook of physics at the time, the interaction between magnet
and battery appeared unintelligible because electricity and mag-
netism were understood to be two separate physical phenomena.
André-Marie Ampère investigated Oersted’s strange phenomenon
by developing a new instrument, the “astatic needle”, whose axis
is identical to the direction of the magnetic dip, thereby reducing
the effect of terrestrial magnetism on the experimental apparatus.
Having thereby isolated the phenomenon of interest, Ampère
began mapping out its different aspects by systematically varying
a large number of experimental parameters (e.g., strength and
polarity of the battery, length and material of the needle). In order
to describe the various effects of these alterations, Ampère had to
reconceive existing concepts, such as “current”, and introduce new
ones, such as the “single circular circuit” formed by the needle and
the connecting wire (Steinle, 2002).
The example of Ampère’s research points out that exploratory
experiments consist in the systematic, one-by-one variation of
experimental parameters. The systematic variation then allows
scientists to establish empirically stable patterns about the activ-
ity or behavior of the entities in the investigated phenomenon.
Ampère’s combination of the astatic needle with the concept of
the “singular circular circuit” also shows that in scientific practice,
concept formation and technological development go hand in
hand. Without properly working instruments, the phenomenon
cannot be isolated from other, currently irrelevant patterns of the
investigated system (i.e., the “noise”). But without the appropriate
concepts, the measurement outcomes cannot be made intelligible
as providing evidence for the activity or behavior of the entities
in the domain. A successful series of exploratory experiments also
identifies the parameters that are necessary for the production of
the investigated effect (Ampère called this fait general, a “simple
case” which displays a general pattern with particular clarity
cf. Steinle, 2002). But previously successful experiments are not
themselves sufficient for applying empirical concepts, because
such concepts must also be projectible to hitherto unexamined
cases (they have an “open texture”, cf. Waismann, 1945; see
also Wilson, 2006). Similarly, the laws formulated with empirical
concepts do not only reliably track previous empirical regularities,
but also provide inferential norms for further experimentation.
Such norms allow scientists to assess what unobserved instances
would fall under a law’s scope based on a limited number of
observations (Lange, 2000a).
The electromagnetism case provides the context for expli-
cating the first research strategy with which researchers can
meet the “brain on its own terms”, namely by developing non-
cognitive concepts and formulating general principles of brain
organization. Resting state functional connectivity studies are
particularly suited for such exploratory research, because they
allow researchers to vary a large number of experimental parame-
ters. “Functional connectivity” can be experimentally determined
using various instruments (PET, fMRI, multi-unit recordings,
electro- and magnetoencephalography, i.e., EEG and MEG),
resulting in different spatial and temporal resolutions as well as to
whether connectivity is assumed between single-neuron activity,
neuronal assemblies or large-scale neural interactions. Further-
more, there are multiple ways in which experimental parameters
can be correlated (across or within conditions, subjects, or time
courses). The absence of an explicit cognitive task in resting state
studies that would drive the data analysis functions like the align-
ment of axis and magnetic dip in Ampère’s astatic needle exper-
iments. It isolates the phenomenon of interest and the (poten-
tially law-like) pattern it displays, namely slow, low-frequency
fluctuations within the time-series recorded by the respective
measuring instrument (such as hemodynamic responses in fMRI,
cf. Biswal et al., 1995). From the psychological outlook of task-
based experiments, such fluctuations were ruled out as unin-
telligible noise against the differential changes in activity that
could be attributed to the subject’s execution of a task (although
the fluctuations were already recognized in early fMRI studies,
cf. Weisskoff et al., 1993). With the emergence of the resting
state paradigm, such fluctuations not induced by cognitive tasks
were reconsidered as neuroscientifically meaningful, because their
temporal correlations are taken to reflect the statistical history of
co-activated areas that are functionally connected to one another
(Cohen et al., 2008).
It is important to note that resting-state and task-based anal-
yses cannot be exhaustively contrasted along the task/non-task
dimension. Resting state paradigms obviously include instruc-
tions (the subject is asked to remain still in the scanner),
but importantly, there is no contrast condition that constrains
how the recorded time-series are subsequently correlated to
one another. What furthermore distinguishes resting state from
“classical” task-based approaches is the theoretical shift to
consider large-scale networks, rather than isolated functional
areas as the analytical unit of functional architecture (Sporns,
2011). Data-driven analysis methods can also be combined with
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“unconstrained” experimental stimulations such as the free view-
ing of a movie (cf. Bartels and Zeki, 2005), suggesting that not all
task-based studies are driven by cognitive hypotheses. Instead of
a simple task/non-task dichotomy, the variety of neuroimaging
methods may be therefore better captured by a combinatorial
matrix with multiple dimensions (e.g., cognitive/non-cognitive,
hypothesis/data-driven). While this paper focuses on exploratory
experiments that do not employ cognitive concepts, analyzing
other combinations of neuroimaging methods is an exciting task
for further research (see also Dumit, 2014 in this special issue for a
historical example of an exploratory neuroscientific experiment).
The possibility of establishing functional connectivity with
various instruments and correlational techniques also marks an
important difference to the electromagnetism case. Researchers
have reached a consensus by defining “functional connec-
tivity” as a “temporal correlation between spatially remote
neurophysiological events” (Friston et al., 1993; quote from Fris-
ton, 1994, 58). But nobody has so far determined which exper-
imental parameters are necessary for the production of activity
patterns that count as functionally connected. While some com-
mentators therefore criticized the concept as elusive (Horwitz,
2003), I argued elsewhere that “functional connectivity” is best
conceived as combinatorially vague. Combinatory vagueness arises
here because it is not only unclear how spatially remote two
events have to be, but also because different neuronal events
can fulfill the definition (Haueis, 2012). Ampère’s experimental
series consisted in a one-dimensional measurement of electro-
magnetic induction with one instrument, the astatic needle. In
contrast, each imaging modality and analysis step has certain
advantages over others for the investigation of functional con-
nectivity, because the entities within its application domain are
heterogeneous and complex. It may therefore be unlikely that
the experimental system investigating the different aspects of the
general phenomenon of functional connectivity can be “reduced”
to a “simple case”.
In absence of a “simple case”, the status of general laws
that govern all studies of functional connectivity has to be
approached with caution. In a recent review, for instance, Palva
and Palva (2012) proposed that spontaneous, infra-slow fluctua-
tions (0.01–0.1 Hz) in EEG, fMRI and psychophysical measure-
ments all point to the same underlying phenomenon, namely
that the slow activity of large-scale intrinsic connectivity networks
modulates how the activity of neurons and neuronal assemblies
oscillates at higher frequencies. These oscillations in turn indicate
the speed and strength with which electrical signals get transferred
within the cortex. The evidence for convergence was that the
infra-slow fluctuations in EEG, fMRI and psychophysical data
could all be mathematically described by a scale-free power law,
even though different mechanisms might underlie the oscillations
observed at a specific spatial scale. Researchers would then be
able to predict the pattern from the data of each modality with
the same inductive strategy—i.e., that each time a scale-free,
slow fluctuation changes its phase, the speed of the oscillation
at a specific scale will change as well. The issue is that without
necessary conditions for functional connectivity, similar mathe-
matical properties of various measurement signals do not entitle
neuroscientists to attribute all fluctuations to the same neural
entity (i.e., large-scale, intrinsically connected networks). Based
on the current technology, it is not possible to tell whether there
are other neuronal assemblies whose infra-slow activity patterns
require a different inductive strategy.
HOW TO IDENTIFY NEURAL ENTITIES WITH EXPLORATORY
EXPERIMENTS
The comparison of connectivity studies to the electromagnetism
case showed how exploratory experiments can help researchers
to formulate general principles about human brain organiza-
tion. But an example from experimental physics is insufficient
to understand how entities subsumed under such principles are
identified in multi-disciplinary contexts such as human brain
mapping. This section therefore introduces an example from
interdisciplinary molecular biology to examine why the use of
cognitive tasks has left researchers uncertain about which entities
underlie the changes in fMRI signal, and which alternative
research strategy could help them to identify such entities via
various experimental methods. Historical research on molecular
biology has shown that different manipulation techniques can
identify the same entities even if researchers hold conflicting
theoretical commitments. The biochemist J. Monod viewed the
genome as static (except for mutation) while the cellular bac-
teriophage geneticist F. Jacob viewed it as dynamic. By com-
bining Monod’s temporal analysis of lactose digestion in E. coli
and Jacob’s spatial DNA injection techniques, their collaborative
experiments showed that enzyme gene expression followed imme-
diately after DNA was injected in an inhibitor-free cytoplasm.
Despite favoring Jacob’s view of the genome, the agreement upon
the same entities and processes allowed both researchers to ask
new questions about scientifically significant topics, such as the
mechanism of protein synthesis (Burian, 2001).
The Jacob-Monod experiments resolved a theoretical conflict
because they fulfilled the mutual manipulability criteria for mech-
anistic explanations (Craver, 2007). These criteria hold that an
acting entity is a part of a mechanism if its activity changes once
the whole system is manipulated, and that the activity of the
whole system changes once a particular entity in it is manipulated.
Only the combination of Monod’s and Jacob’s techniques fulfilled
these criteria because “Monod did not have tools for manipulating
DNA, for mapping genes, and for controlling crosses between
bacteria, while Jacob did not have a system subject to the fine-
grained controls that Monod did” (Burian, 2001, p. 395, empha-
sis added). For Craver, neuroscientific experiments that study
phenomena like the action potential or the spatial orientation
of rats in a water maze fulfill these criteria because they track
causal structures trough activation, interference and intervention
techniques (Craver, 2002). But none of these examples includes
straightforwardly cognitive phenomena or technologies that are
primarily used to investigate the human brain, such as task-
based fMRI. Here, the working assumption behind the functional
localization of cognitive tasks is that the BOLD contrast is an
indexical trace of task-induced neuronal activity. But changes in
fMRI signal do not only track spiking rates of single cells, but
also neuromodulatory effects and feedback loops within cortico-
cortical microcircuits. Because different oxygenation levels alone
are insufficient to conclude whether the activity within these
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circuits is largely inhibitory, excitatory or whether inhibition and
excitation balance each other out, the BOLD signal is causally
ambiguous (cf. Logothetis, 2008). A task-related BOLD-increase
is therefore not necessarily equivalent to a net increase in firing
output of stimulus-specific neurons within the measured cortical
area. Because the BOLD contrast indistinguishably subsumes this
option among other physiological scenarios, fMRI technology
alone does not provide the technical means to disambiguate
the causal structure of excitatory-inhibitory microcircuits. Fur-
thermore, the large population view of neuroimaging—where
a voxel contains ∼5 million neurons—prevents the assignment
of “activity” to specific entities—be it circuits or single cells—
that would be parts of a mechanism underlying the cognitive
phenomenon.
Because fMRI evidence for task-induced changes in neu-
ral activity rests on a causally ambiguous physiological origin,
fMRI experiments in cognitive neuroscience fail to meet the
mutual manipulability criteria at the component level. Measuring
system-level changes induced by cognitive tasks does therefore
not decompose the organization of cortico-cortical microcircuits
into its different active components such as excitatory pyra-
midal cells or inhibitory basket cells. Philosophers of neuro-
science such as William Bechtel have previously underestimated
the problem of the physiological origin of fMRI signal and
concluded that “neuroimaging has produced many determinate
results that have been incorporated into information processing
models of cognition” (Bechtel, in press, p. 15). Bechtel proposes
that the causal ambiguity of fMRI parallels the use of Golgi
staining in neuroanatomy, where it is still unknown why silver
nitrate only stains 1–5% of the cells in the prepared nervous
tissue. But this parallel only holds for the physical assumptions
behind fMRI. Only the magnetic properties of different cerebral
tissue types are independent from the investigated domain in
the same way as the chemical properties exploited to reveal
neuroanatomical cell properties are.6 In contrast, the biologi-
cal assumptions of cognitive scientists (i.e., that a task-induced
BOLD increase reflects increased neuronal spiking output) are
in direct conflict with the physiological knowledge about the
organization of excitatory-inhibitory micro-circuits. But because
cognitive neuroscientists do not provide a controllable sys-
tem comparable to Monod’s in the molecular biology exam-
ple above, these conflicting theoretical commitments could so
far not be resolved by combining cognitive and neuroscientific
methods.
If neuroscientists seek to explore the brain via various exper-
imental methods, they would first need to establish which neu-
roscientific measurement techniques are able to identify which
neural entities and activities. Such an exploration can proceed
independently of whether such entities are causal preconditions
for cognitive capacities. Noninvasive techniques (e.g., PET, DWI,
6Hacking (1983) argues that this independence is required to regard experi-
mental observations as theory-free in the relevant sense (and thus “determi-
nate” in Bechtel’s sense). Moreover, since the magnetic properties of the MRI
contrast are well known (Huettel et al., 2004), Bechtel’s comparison of fMRI
to the unknown chemical properties in Golgi staining seems to be no parallel
at all.
EEG/MEG, fMRI) usually investigate activity patterns of sin-
gle cortical areas or inter-areal networks, but their restriction
to correlational techniques makes them insufficient to establish
causal knowledge (for a critical review of methods that estimate
causality in fMRI data, see Smith et al., 2011 and Lohmann
et al., 2012). Here, technological innovation is required to address
these currently unanswerable issues.7 While invasive electrode
recordings can trace spiking rates from well-isolated neurons near
the electrode tip, multi-unit recordings suffer from the same
causal ambiguity as the BOLD-signal, because changes in the
local field potential (LFP) are the sum of postsynaptic potentials,
soma-dendritic spike after-potentials, and membrane oscillations
of the surrounding neuronal assembly (Logothetis, 2008). Thus,
no experimental technique so far unambiguously measures or
manipulates the excitatory-inhibitory activity of cortical micro-
circuits, or the unimodal processing within cortical columns
(Horton and Adams, 2005).
WHY WE NEED PRECISE EXPLORATORY EXPERIMENTS AT THE
MESOSCOPIC SCALE
This section introduces the parameters scale and precision in order
to show the link between the issues discussed in the last two
sections, i.e., between the missing necessary conditions for “func-
tional connectivity” and the difficulties of manipulating neuronal
assemblies. For the present purposes, a tripartite distinction of
scales can adequately reflect the investigation of different aspects
of brain organization in neuroscientific practice (Sporns, 2011).
At the top of this scheme is the macroscopic scale, consisting of
entities such as subcortical and cortical areas (e.g., hippocampus
or orbitofrontal cortex) and large-scale inter-areal networks (e.g.,
the somatosensory-somatomotor network in the macaque cortex,
cf. Honey et al., 2007). In the human case, the structure and func-
tion of such entities is usually investigated by noninvasive imaging
modalities (fMRI, PET, DWI, MEG/EEG). At the intermediate
stage is the mesoscopic scale of neuronal assemblies, consisting of
entities such as inhibitory-excitatory micro-circuits or cortical
mini- and macro-columns (Buxhoeveden and Casanova, 2002;
Logothetis, 2008) that encompass populations between few 100–
10,000 neurons. Below such neuronal assemblies is the microscopic
scale of single cells such as neurons, glia and subcellular parts
such as axons and synapses. Microscopic entities are usually the
target of micro-electrode recordings or various tracer techniques
in animal studies.
The second parameter, precision, consists of two subclasses,
the first being the degree of precision, i.e., the (material) capacity
of an imaging modality to display two spatially close measurement
7Recent advances in optogenetics (i.e., the insertion of light-sensitive genes
which induce cellular activity) may address some of these issues. In a recent
study, Lee et al. (2010) optogenetically induced neuronal spiking in genetically
identified cell types of anesthetized rats, while carefully controlling for influ-
encing factors at the system level (e.g., ventilation levels and frequencies, rectal
temperature cf. ibid., 788). Whether this method resolves causal ambiguity
remains controversial, however, since the final neuronal response measured
is the net outcome of all inhibitory and excitatory activities of a cortical
microcircuit (see the discussion in Logothetis, 2010). Additionally, since
an equivalently tight system control of humans seems unlikely, optogenetic
methods may not be directly transferrable to the human case.
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points within the brain as two different image points (e.g., pixel,
voxel) in a brain map (i.e., its spatial resolution), or the capacity
of an invasive instrument (e.g., electrodes, scalpels, chemical
tracers, staining techniques) to allow structural or functional
differentiation between different parts of nervous tissue. Equally,
different instruments possess high or low temporal resolutions
(Fingelkurts et al., 2005). The actual precision consists in the
researchers’ ability to practically discriminate between different
neural entities by using such invasive instruments or using what
is displayed by brain maps (e.g., anatomical boundaries) in an
experimental intervention (for a similar treatment of the preci-
sion of semantic terms, see Keil, 2010). The normative demand
in neuroscientific practice is to match scale and precision in a
way that the experimental conditions which are the criteria for
applying empirical concepts can account for the entities (or their
behavior) subsumed under such concepts.
With the parameters of scale and precision in place, it becomes
clear that the issues discussed in the previous sections concern our
current inability to intervene in and understand the mesoscopic
scale of human brain organization.8 With regard to the power-
law governed infra-slow fluctuations discussed in section “New
concepts to explore the brain? Lessons from electromagnetism”
it is unclear whether the extension of this principle to the activ-
ity of neuronal assemblies in between cellular mechanisms and
macroscopic BOLD and EEG oscillations is warranted. If it was
warranted, restricting it to micro- and macroscales would be an
artificial limitation (similar to “All coppers in North America are
conductors” cf. Lange, 2000a, p. 242). If it was not warranted, such
an extension would be an unmotivated bend, because researchers
would need a different inductive strategy to understand the func-
tional connectivity of neuronal assemblies. Our current inability
to resolve the indeterminacy between these two options results
from the missing experimental techniques at the mesoscopic
scale discussed in section “How to identify neural entities with
exploratory experiments”. What neuroscientists would need is a
mesoscope, i.e., an instrument (or a set of instruments) that can
be used to measure or manipulate entities at the mesoscopic scale
in a controlled and unambiguous fashion.9 The mesoscope is the
presupposition for systematically varying experimental parame-
ters, which in turn establishes the criteria for applying empirical
concepts to the mesoscopic scale of the brain. Consequently, a
successful exploratory experiment at the mesoscale would fulfill
the criteria for mutual manipulation only with the degree of
8To put it in an apt metaphor one neuroscientist once suggested in a
personal correspondence with me: Everything in between the function of
single neurons and the whole brain constitutes the “Bermuda triangle of the
neurosciences”.
9Since every scientific instrument possesses inherent limitations (noise, arti-
facts, limits in resolution etc.), increasing control or descreasing ambiguity
should be seen as the practical norms against which technological progress
is evaluated. Invasive electrocorticography (ECoG), for instance, could be
developed into a “mesoscope” if the precision of the electrodes (currently
measuring ca. 500,000 neurons) would be increased by an order of magnitude
through further technological development. Even with such an advance,
however, ECoG would remain practically limited to neurosurgical patients,
and may still possess the ambiguity of LFP signals found by microelectrode
recordings (see Ojemann et al., 2013 for a review of ECoG, BOLD and LFP
measurements in epilepsy patients).
precision with which it describes an investigated brain mecha-
nism. The mechanism of the action potential, for instance, can
be described in coarse terms such as hyper- and depolarization,
sodium and potassium channels, or in terms of sodium-voltage
gated channels Nav1.1, Nav1.6 specific to human Purkjine cells
(cf. Sirtes, 2010). But choosing the appropriate descriptive scope
also depends on whether the material precision of the measuring
instrument can be matched to the scale of the entities investigated
in practice. Because of the causal ambiguity of LFP signals mea-
sured by multi-unit recordings, current invasive measurements
do not satisfy the mutual manipulability criteria with respect to
the mesoscopic entities (e.g., inhibitory-excitatory micro-circuits)
for which such measurements are supposed to be evidence for.
Given this scale-dependent failure of mutual manipulation, it is
so far unclear whether the use of concepts like “cortical column”
or “microcircuit” can establish determinate truth claims about
the alleged entities these concepts are referring to (Horton and
Adams, 2005; Logothetis, 2008).
The missing understanding of the mesoscopic scale also points
towards the initial motivating factor for the need of exploratory
experiments: the lack of a unified theory of brain function. Since
both philosophers (e.g., Craver, 2007) and neuroscientists (see for
instance http://www.humanbrainproject.eu/neuroscience.html)
are critical of the idea that a single unified theory, if possible,
is necessary to adequately understand the brain, the following
argument will be put in the conditional form: If there was such
a theory, it would have to provide both general principles for
and the evidential relationships in between the three scales,
in order to be explanatory. Without properly understanding
how the uncharted territory of the mesoscopic scale looks like,
the formulation of such principles and relationships is not
possible or incomplete. Thus, exploratory experiments that target
the mesoscale, together with the exploratory investigation of
non-cognitive parameters at the micro- and macroscopic scale,
will allow researchers to establish new and revise old concepts
in order to meet the brain “on its own terms”. And even if it
was the case that the laws or principles that practitioners are
able to express with these concepts cannot be used to form
one unified theory (such as in the case of electromagnetism),
exploratory experiments will still increase our understanding
since the patterns picked out by such laws would not only be
independently stable, but perhaps also unintelligible from a
psychological conceptual outlook.
EXPLORATORY EXPERIMENTS AND CONNECTOMICS
RESEARCH
With this scheme of the status and prospects of exploratory
neuroscientific experiments in place, it is possible to assess the
relationship between current proposals for large-scale mappings
of the human connectome and the notion of “meeting the brain
on its own terms”. What needs to be addressed first is whether
the use of whole-brain imaging instruments (fMRI, DWI) in
connectomics is suited for exploratory experimentation. The brief
discussion in the section “Theoretical Foundations” suggested
that hypothesis-driven fMRI approaches suffer from the weakness
of statistical null hypothesis testing in causally dense systems
such as the brain. Functional magnetic resonance imaging would
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be an appropriate instrument to test hypotheses if it belongs to
the class of narrow instruments (such as a thermometer), which
measure a small number of data points along one dimension (cf.
Franklin, 2005). Functional magnetic resonance imaging experi-
ments, however, record a large number of four-dimensional data
points (time series per three-dimensional voxel): each recorded
brain slice consists of thousands of voxels for each of which
hundreds or thousands of measurements throughout the time
of an experimental session are conducted. Functional magnetic
resonance imaging also has a multi-dimensional signal: besides
tracking the multifaceted oxy-deoxy ratio (consisting of cerebral
blood flow, volume, metabolic rate of oxygen and glucose), it
records “noise” (such as respiration rate or heartbeat) which can
itself be subject to meaningful physiological investigation (Jezzard
et al., 1993; Bianciardi et al., 2009). Taken together with the causal
density of the brain, the large amount of multidimensional data
suggests that fMRI—and by extension similar noninvasive whole
brain imaging techniques—rather resembles wide instruments
like DNA microarrays. Such instruments monitor the responses
of a system as a whole, rather than recording the interactions of
an isolated part within that system.
The above analysis, if correct, suggests that fMRI is indeed
better suited for exploring system-wide interactions than to test
cognitive hypotheses about isolated parts of neuronal interac-
tion. Using such hypotheses in neuroimaging leaves room for
exploration because they are so general that fMRI studies testing
them leave open many possible outcomes (cf. Franklin, 2005). The
reason for that openness is that employing arbitrary thresholds
to study the causally dense system of the human brain does
not entitle neuroscientists to infer that the activation patterns
extracted from the data would have occurred only when the
allegedly “confirmed” hypothesis was true (Klein, 2010). This lack
of explanatory power is dramatically increased by the missing
biological knowledge and manipulability of mesoscopic entities
in the human brain. The analysis of whole brain imaging as wide
instrumentation therefore suggests that while neuroscientists are
de facto using general cognitive hypotheses to investigate the
unknown aspects of the human brain, what is also at stake in such
inquiries is how various non-cognitive experimental parameters
are systematically related to each other in this causally dense
system. The increasing recognition among neuroscientists that
resting-state fMRI and other imaging modalities (e.g., DWI) can
be used to map out “wiring diagrams” of the human brain (Biswal
et al., 2010) reflects a partial recalibration of disciplinary interests
to account for these non-cognitive parameters.
As has been shown in the case of the complete mapping of the
nervous system of the nematode C. elegans, the establishment of
wiring diagrams also represents a variety of exploratory research
(Ankeny, 2000). Such diagrams of the canonical neural circuitry
of an organism provide descriptive models, based on which spe-
cific hypotheses, theories and explanations can be subsequently
formulated, developed and tested. Nevertheless, the construction
of the C. elegans diagram relied on background assumptions such
as the one-to-one correspondence between neuronal connectivity
and the spatial location of cells in structural micrographs, or the
assumption that the overlap in data from different specimens
indicates anatomical invariance. But the purpose of this research
program was not to test a specific theory that was based on
such assumptions, but to provide a prototype of and inferential
norms for reasoning about metazoan neural organization or
the individual variability of its connectional patterns. Only such
further experiments—made possible by the information provided
in the wiring diagram—could lead to results which question the
principles used to construct the diagram in the first place.
The acknowledgment that wiring diagrams of neuronal con-
nectivity represent a revisable standard for further research
is equivalently stressed by neuroscientists studying the human
brain. Based on the principle that “individual brain regions main-
tain individual connection profiles”, Sporns et al. (2005, p. 0247)
proposed that the structural mapping of axonal projections via
diffusion-weighted imaging, combined with functional connec-
tivity measurements via fMRI, MEG and EEG, would provide “a
first draft of the human connectome” at the macroscopic scale.
The research program proposed by Bohland et al. (2009) amends
such a draft by mapping mesoscopic connectivity patterns with
high-throughput neuronal tracer, neurotropic virus and viral vec-
tor methods in the mouse, targeted and standardized connectivity
experiments in the macaque, and the application of these results
to a technologically improved histological mapping of human
neuroanatomy. On a conceptual level, Swanson and Bota (2010)
provide a consistent, multi-scale classification system required
for the neuroinformatics analysis of structural connectivity data,
which nevertheless allows for empirical revision and the compar-
ison of competing classification methods.
What the examples above indicate is that model-building and
exploratory experimentation are not mutually exclusive activities,
but that scientific practice is instead often characterized by iter-
atively switching between various modes of research. As a result
of the assumption that “the mind is what the brain does” and
a narrow focus on hypothesis testing, iteration in neuroscience
has so far only been discussed as the repetitive reassessment of
knowledge claims about the human brain through the contin-
uous refinement of cognitive hypotheses (Kosslyn, 1999). What
is therefore missing is how methodological iteration, i.e., the
alternation between exploratory experiments, hypothesis-testing,
technological development and question-generation initiates and
equips the reassessment of knowledge claims (Elliott, 2012).
Human brain mapping is not yet in the position to enter this iter-
ative mode of research, because the missing knowledge about the
mesoscale requires further exploratory experiments that establish
more adequate neuroscientific concepts. The outline of parallel
research strategies and wiring diagram projects at different scales,
however, suggests that exploratory research should neither be
seen as a separate, or even preliminary stage of scientific inquiry
followed by hypothesis-testing and theory-building, but rather as
“profoundly important for ongoing scientific activity” (O’Malley
et al., 2009, p. 613).
What deserves special attention is that the large-scale con-
nectomics projects substantially diverge in their definition of the
mesoscopic scale. While Sporns et al. (2005) identify cortical
minicolumns as the basic mesoscopic organizational unit, Boh-
land et al. (2009) postulate invariant connectivity patterns that
would contain cortical columns (which are composed of many
minicolumns) as “microcircuitry on a finer scale” (ibid., p. 3).
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Swanson and Bota (2010), in turn, view mesoscopic connectivity
as the stereotypic possibilities of certain neurons (e.g., spinal
nerve ganglion cells) to act, but also admit a variety of valid but
competing classification methods of nervous cell types. Here, a
convergence or mutual amendment seems to be less likely. Many
columnar structures in the cortex, for instance, show hetero-
geneous response properties, vary in their presence within or
between species, and do not decompose into a precise number
of mini-columns. Such discrepancies have led skeptical commen-
tators to conclude that the vertical cell bands found in Nissl-
stained sections represent a functionally insignificant byproduct
of ontogenetic development (so-called ontogenetic columns, cf.
Horton and Adams, 2005). Current scholars have in turn sug-
gested to either dynamically reconceive the column concept in
terms of distributed connectivity networks or to replace it with
successor concepts such as the “canonical microcircuit” (da Costa
and Martin, 2010). Of course, such controversies over the con-
ceptual foundations of neuronal assemblies or the issue of cross-
classification of neuron types do not make the efforts to establish
wiring diagrams obsolete. They rather show again that these
diagrams will only lead to a more comprehensive understanding
of human brain function when they are combined with the search
for descriptively adequate, non-cognitive concepts via mesoscopic
exploratory experiments.
It should be finally remarked that although connectomics
research seems to date the most promising candidate to meet
the brain “on its own terms”, its aims are often equally framed
under the assumption that “the mind is what the brain does”.
Sporns et al. (2005, p. 0248), for instance, hypothesize that the
structural connectome places constraints on brain dynamics and
“shapes the operations and processes of human cognition” while
Bohland et al. (2009, p. 3) write that mesoscopic connectivity
patterns will “aid our understanding of specific mental functions”.
Although such formulations may be tentative, they overlook a
crucial feature of the exploratory establishment of wiring dia-
grams. Since the terms “function” and “cognition” are not co-
extensive, a complete mapping of structural connectivity could
indicate functionally significant patterns of brain connectivity
that are unintelligible from our current cognitive outlook on
human brain function. A comparison with the Human Genome
project is particularly instructive here: while only 1% of the
genomic sequences code for protein—the initial definition of
“gene”—mapping the other 99% revealed entities (e.g., micro-
RNAs, distal enhancers) that turned out to be more crucial to
genetic understanding than initially anticipated (Lichtman and
Sanes, 2008). In light of the conceptual indeterminacies and
required technological development at the mesoscopic scale, it is
more than likely that a further exploration of the human brain
will disclose new entities whose function cannot be captured with
our current cognitive concepts. By temporarily suspending the use
of cognitive concepts altogether, connectomics could therefore
achieve its full potential for tackling how the human brain works.
CONCLUSION
This paper proposed an alternative philosophical understanding
of human brain mapping according to which neuroscientists do
not have to presuppose that “the mind is what the brain does”
in order to investigate human brain function. By stressing the
methodological autonomy of neuroscience from psychology, the
framework can capture the non-cognitive aspects of connec-
tomics methods which have not been substantially discussed in
philosophy of neuroscience yet. By systematically applying the
philosophical and historical literature on exploratory experiments
to neuroscience, the paper also showed how this framework can
be applied in neuroscientific practice, if researchers investigate
human brain organization without testing cognitive hypotheses
or using cognitive concepts. The discussion of such exploratory
research strategies revealed the following desiderata for further
empirical research: based on the possible independence
of neuroscientific laws from psychological generalizations,
researchers should provisionally extend the concept of “functional
connectivity” to the mesoscopic scale. The parallel experimental
identification of neural entities irrespective of their causal roles for
cognitive functions, combined with the technological development
of mesoscopic measurement and intervention techniques, could
then determine whether the provisional extension of “functional
connectivity” has been warranted. In the meantime, further
macroscopic aspects of neural connectivity can be established by
the exploratory use of wide whole-brain imaging instruments.
The validity and integration of such system-level results will
depend on which organizational units can be experimentally
established at the mesoscopic scale. Note that in exploratory
research, the experimental conditions are themselves the criteria
for identifying such units (as opposed to the functional identi-
fication of brain regions via task responses in hypothesis-driven
cognitive neuroimaging studies). Currently, the experimental
designs of functional connectivity studies do not provide neces-
sary conditions for identifying large scale networks (cf. section
“Exploring the brain with new concepts”) nor do the different
clustering algorithms in such studies equally account for gradually
changing connectivity profiles (cf. Haueis, 2012). Therefore, the
purpose of this paper was not to define the criteria for identifying
neural entities non-cognitively, but to show how brain researchers
could establish such criteria if they would implement exploratory
research strategies such as the ones outlined above.
It should be mentioned again that the notion of “meeting the
brain on its own terms” is not intended to be an argument to
disprove that the “mind is what the brain does”. It was rather
meant to show that this assumption is not without alternatives,
given that discovery-based connectomics approaches have the
potential to reveal non-cognitive working principles of human
brain organization. Applied to the mesoscopic scale, this potential
can be fulfilled independently of our current cognitive outlook
on human brain function, to which connectivity researchers
commonly relate their results. Once further exploration leads
to new concepts and principles that capture mesoscopic brain
organization, researchers could re-assess our current cognitive
concepts, and whether they are still adequate to capture this more
complex picture of how the human brain works.
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